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Abstract - This paper tests the hypothesis that democratisation is conducive to less environmental depletion 
due to human activity. Using Interrupted Time Series (ITS) design for a panel of 47 transition countries and 
two indexes of pollution, CO2 emissions and PM10 concentrations, I find that democracies and dictatorships 
have two different targets of environmental quality, with those of democracies higher than those of 
dictatorships. Income inequality may as well alter this targets, but with opposite effects in the two different 
regimes. 
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 1 Introduction
The relation between various measures of pollution and democracy is highly
debated. Two dierent views about the eect of democracy on the environ-
ment have been put forward: a dominant thinking of the 1970s was that
democracy and its associated liberties to pollute, consume and procreate
would generate ecological catastrophes, and the inability of governments to
control the \tragedy of the commons" is an evident example of such a fail-
ure of democracies in the management of environmental issues (Desai, [11],
Hardin, [20]). Democracy is also known to be a means for redistributing
income and power to the poor; Rodrik [44] for example, presents evidence
that democracy is associated with an higher share of wages in GDP and
thus lower inequality and Milanovic [39] nds that democracies with greater
inequality of factor income redistribute more to the poor, so to those whose
consumption has an higher marginal impact on the environment.
At present, however, there is a growing empirical research on the possible
anities between democracy and ecology. There are several reasons for such
a positive relationship1, basically: i. democracies respect individual rights
and so environmentalists are free to market their ideas and transform them
into environmental legislation; ii. the necessity of democratic government to
be elected (or reelected) makes them more responsive to their citizens; iii.
open political systems are more likely to learn from scientists and other con-
cerned citizens than are autocracies; vi. democratic states tend to cooperate
with each other within international environmental agencies, and nally, v.
because democracies all have free market economies, business in the market
can be subject both to environmental incentives and sanctions (Dasgupta
and Maler [10], Schultz and Crockett [45] and Payne [42]). Furthermore,
democracies respect human life more than autocracies and therefore they
are more responsive to life-threatening environmental degradation (Gled-
itsh and Sverdrup [18])
In the empirical literature, Bhattarai and Hamming [6], for example, use
a measure of institutional quality (measured by an index of political rights
and civil liberties) to account for the role of dierent policy regimes in the
causes of deforestation in Latin America, Africa and Asia. Torras and Boyce
[46] use a similar technique for a panel data survey of a variety of air and
water pollution indicators. Gallagher and Thacker [16] introduce a concept
of \stock of democracy" to study its implications through time. They all
nd positive evidence that civil liberties and political rights are associated
with more pro-environmental behaviour.
In this paper, I make use of Interrupted Time Series (ITS) design to study
the eect of democratisation on two indicators of air quality, CO2 emissions
and the level of PM10, in a panel of 47 transition countries during the
1for a systematisation of the argument, see Payne (1995)
1period 1950-2002 (for CO2) and 1990-2002 for the other measure. Panel data
estimation methods allow control for unobservable country-specic eects
that result in a missing-variable bias in cross-sectional studies. I included
in my sample only transition countries because I believe it is a natural and
transparent way to study the eect of democratisation. The inclusion of
countries which have not shifted regime may bias the estimate due to the
fact that other events (and not democracy) may be responsible for such a
change (like, for instance, technological progress). This eect may be more
easily disentangled in transition countries due to the possibility of running
segmented regressions, as it will become clearer later.
The method of ITS is a powerful quasi-experimental approach for evalu-
ating the eects of interventions. Segmented regression analysis of ITS data
allows us to assess, in statistical terms, how much an intervention changed an
outcome of interest, immediately and over time, instantly or with delay, and
whether factors other than the intervention could explain the change. If a
positive association between democracy and various measure of environmen-
tal quality is found in the literature, without comparing whether dierent
regimes have the opposite eect, nothing can be said, in principle, about
the goodness of that regime in promoting good policies for environmental
protection. One example will be illuminating. Suppose we want to study
the eect through time of democracy on the level of CO2 emissions, and sup-
pose we nd a negative and signicant eect, so democratic regimes tend
to decrease emissions. But what if also dictatorships reduced them? If that
was the case, it would not be possible to state that democracies are good for
the environment, because this would imply that non-democracies are not,
which is not necessarily true. If both democracies and non-democracies have
a positive eect on the environmental quality, it is certainly another reason
that is driving this result.
So, contrary to the other methods commonly used in the literature, this
approach is suitable to measure the eect of democratisation through time,
taking into account of other time-variant eects, and moreover, it is capa-
ble of identifying whether other factors (possibly unknown) are driving the
results. Some important observations coming from the empirical evidence
are worth considering: due to the fact that income and democratic insti-
tutions are positively correlated (Barro [4], Przeworski and Limongi [43]),
and also that income and cleaner/more ecient technologies are positively
correlated (Hausman [21]), cross-country empirical works do not establish
causation between regime and various measures of pollution.
Regressions in panel data are usually done by assuming xed eect mod-
els, which can solve the issue of accounting for time invariant heterogeneity,
and often the distinction between democracies and others are done by us-
ing dummies. This approach has the pitfall of not disentangling the eects
of democracy from other eects in play during periods of democracy. It is
well known that other factors may inuence the performance of a country.
2In the ideal situation, one could observe the same country simultaneously
under two dierent types of regime, and this would guarantee that all the
other variables are held constant. But since this is not feasible (what one can
observe is the same country at dierent points in time), a simple regression,
even if it is able to control for time invariant unobservables, could be biased
due to the time variant unobservable variables. Several eects may cause this
bias: History, such as events which occurred during the period considered
providing an alternative explanation of a given phenomenon, maturation, or
processes through which the country produces changes as a function of time
per se (like for example the maturation of technology towards less energy in-
tensive production processes) or even instability, referred at the fact that all
time series are unstable even when no treatments are applied are all typical
unobservable eects that may bias these estimates.
This paper is organised as follows: section 2 motivate the paper, section 3
describes the dataset used and some summary statistics, section 4 illustrates
the estimation techniques and results, and section 5 concludes.
2 Motivations
Does democracy really benet environmental quality? Using a sample of 47
transition countries, I observe that during the period 1990-2002 the average
concentration of PM10 recorded during spells of dictatorship is about 1.36
times bigger than the concentration recorded during democratic periods,
despite the average level of GDP is 2.25 times bigger during democracy
than during dictatorship spells2.
The average intensity of CO2 emissions produced per unit of GDP is
1.17 times larger in periods of dictatorship than in periods of democracy3.
Several countries show clearly a decrease in the intensity of emission per
unit of GDP in proximity to the regime shift:
2The average concentration of PM10 during democracy is 69.67906 and during dic-
tatorship is 89.14407. GDP during democratic periods is, on average, 117,648.9 against
52,189.88 during dictatorship.
3This average is computed over all the 53 years and over all the countries, conditioned
to periods of democracy or dictatorship. The data for periods of democracy show an
intensity of CO2 emissions (in Kg of carbon) per unit of income of 0.1269 against 0.1485
during periods of dictatorship.
3Figure 2.1
Figure 2.1 shows, for Colombia, South Africa, Spain and Bulgaria, the actual
(dotted) and tted (line) levels of intensity of emissions (expressed in tons of
carbon per unit of GDP). The vertical line in each subgure represents the
date of the regime shift. All the four countries have experienced a transition
to democracy after long periods of dictatorship. After the regime shift we
observe a reverse pattern for emissions; while before democratisation the
tendency is to increase the intensity of CO2 emissions in production, later
we observe a decline, which is persistent through time.
Variations in percapita emissions are consistently reduced during demo-
cratic periods as the following simple xed-eects regression that includes












with CO2it denoting predicted variations in the level of percapita CO2
emissions expressed in Kg of carbon occurred between t 1 and t for country
i, GDPit variations in the level of percapita income occurred between t 1
and t for country i, and Demit is a dummy variable coded 1 during periods
of democracy, and 0 otherwise. All the estimated coecients are signicant
at 1% level.
4All the results are also signicant at 1% level
4As previously anticipated, variations in CO2 emissions are consistently
reduced during periods characterised by democratic institutions. The coef-
cient related to the variable Dem denotes exactly how the variation in the
level of emissions decreases as a consequence of democratisation. In other
words, it represents the average \kink" in the two tted lines before and
after the regime change, for the whole sample of countries.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
I consider percapita CO2 emissions and PM10 concentrations as depen-
dent variables. Data on CO2 are from Marland, G., T.A. Boden, and R.
J. Andres [34] and are available for the period 1950-2002. They refer to
emissions from burning fossil fuels and manufacturing cement, expressed in
Kg of carbon. Their estimates are based on energy data from the United
Nations and cement data from the US Geological Survey (for an analytical
description of the estimation procedures see [35]. Data for PM10's concen-
tration are available for the period 1990-2002 and the source is World Bank
- World Development indicators' Database. Among the independent vari-
ables, I consider percapita GDP, from Maddison [33] and two trends, one for
democracy (D) and another for dictatorship (A), extrapolated from Prze-
worski's dataset (for a list of variables and sources, refer to table A - Data
and Sources in the Appendix). D (A) represents the number of consecutive
years since the last regime change to democracy (dictatorship). It is coded
0 the year of transition to democracy (dictatorship), and 1, 2, 3 after one,
two, three consecutive years of democracy (dictatorship) and so on. During
periods of dictatorship (democracy) it is coded zero. The last independent
variable used is Inequality, from the EHII dataset of the University of Texas
Inequality Project (UTIP). This measure is an estimate of the Theil's in-
dex of household's income inequality derived from econometric relationships
between UTP-UNIDO (dataset that calculates the industrial pay inequal-
ity measures based on the UNIDO Industrial statistics), other conditioning
variables, and the World Bank's Deninger and Squire Dataset5.
Table B in the appendix lists all the countries included in the sample, and
their respective regime changes to and from democracy. They are mainly
developing countries, with the exception of the countries distinguished by an
asterisk which are considered by IMF (World Economic Outlook updated to
april 2009) developed or advanced. The following table 1 shows the summary
statistics of the primary explanatory variables:
5For a detailed presentation of the techniques used to construct such an index, visit
the University of Texas' website at http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/default.html
5Table 1: Summary statistics of the primary explanatory variables
Variable Description Obs mean Std.Dev. min max
CO2 Kg of carbon per-
capita
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1124 491.798 544.5511 0 2232.621
Y ear Year (from 1950
to 2002)
2491 1976 15.30013 1950 2002
N 2491
64 Estimation techniques and results.
4.1 Diagnostic tests
4.1.1 Panel Unit root test
The rst step to decide the best way to estimate a relationship of interest, is
to choose the appropriate econometric tool. In order to do so, it is necessary
to verify the characteristics of the data generating processes: for each non-
deterministic series (CO2 emissions, percapita GDP, PM10 concentrations
and Inequality), I test whether they have stationary mean and variance.
Available tests for unit root on panel data are based on the Dickey Fuller
test (or its augmented version), so I test the following:
yit = iyit 1 + X0
iti + it (1)
with i = 1;:::;N and t = 1;:::;Ti. i represents the autoregressive coecient
for country i, Xit is matrix representing the exogenous variables in the
model, including any xed eects and individual trends and it are the errors
which are assumed i.i.d.. If jij = 1, then yi contains a unit root. For
practical purpose, the tests for unit root are performed using the following
basic ADF specication:




iti + it (2)
with i = i   1.
Levin, Lin and Chu test assumes that the unit root process is common to
all the cross sections so it assumes i =  for every i. The test is performed
by testing the null hypothesis H0 :  = 0 against the alternative H1 :  < 0
for all the cross section units. Their procedure derives estimates of  from
proxies for yit and yit that are standardised and free of autocorrelation and
deterministic components. For a given set of lag orders pi, their procedure











and denoting (^ ; ^ ) the estimated coecients of equation 3 and ( _ ; _ ) those
of equation 4. They dene, then,  yit and  yit 1 by taking, respectively, yit
and yit 1 and removing the autocorrelations and deterministic components
7using their respective auxiliary estimates
 yit = yit  
pi X
j=1
^ ijyit j   X0
it^  (5)
 yit 1 = yit 1  
pi X
j=1
_ ijyit j   X0
it _  (6)








where si are the estimated standard errors from estimating each ADF in
equation 2. The estimate of  is then obtained from the pooled proxy
equation
~ yit = ~ yit 1 + it (7)




t   ( ~ NT)SN^  2se(^ )m ~ T
m ~ T
! N(0;1)
where t is the standard statistic for ^  = 0, ^ 2 is the estimated variance of
the error term , se(^ ) is the standard error of ^ , and






SN is the mean of the ratios of the long run standard deviation for each
individual, and it is estimated using kernel-based techniques, and m ~ T and
m ~ T are adjustment terms for the mean and standard deviation (for more
details, refer to the original article of Levin, Lin and Chu [29]). In order
to perform this test, I include individual constant terms (xed eects), and
an individual trend, so my Xit matrix is a 2NTx2N matrix, where the rst
NTxN block is a matrix of dummy variables, each representing one single
country, and the other block going from row NT + 1 to 2NT and from
column N +1 to 2N is a matrix of trends, one for each single countries. All
the other terms in the matrix are equal to zero.
If the test for common unit root fails, it might be convenient to check
whether individual unit root exists. Tests available for that are Im, Peasaran
and Shin, Fisher AD and PP tests. Im, Pesaran and Shin test begin by
8specifying a separate ADF regression for each cross-section according to
equation 2 with the null
H0 : i = 0 for every i = 1;2;:::;N
and the alternative hypothesis is
H1 :

i = 0 for i = 1;2;:::;N1
i < 0 for i = N1 + 1;N1 + 2;:::;N
That can be interpreted as a nonzero fraction of the individual processes
is stationary. After having estimated the separate ADF regressions, the







is adjusted to arrive to the desired statistics. Critical values are provided in
the Im, Pesaran and Shin's paper [25] for dierent number of cross sections
and time periods when pi = 0 for all i, but in the general case when the lag
order in equation 2 may be nonzero for some cross-sections, they show that a










i=1 V ar( tiT(pi))
! N(0;1)
and the expression for the expected mean and variance of the ADF regres-
sion t-statistics, E( tiT(pi)) and V ar( tiT(pi)) are provided by Im, Pesaran
and Shin for various values of T and p and dierent test equation assump-
tions. I will use, in this paper, one lag and, as deterministic component, an
individual constant, without introducing any trend term. Finally, there are
other two tests for checking individual unit root: Fisher ADF and Fisher
PP tests, which are based upon the idea by Maddala, Wu and Choi, and
combine the p-values from individual unit root tests. They work as fol-
lows: dene i the p-value from individual unit root test for cross-section















9where  1 is the inverse of a standard normal cumulative distribution func-
tion. For both the Fisher tests, I specify as exogenous variables an individual
constant (xed eect) and an individual time trend.
Table C in the appendix shows the results of the tests for all the non-
deterministic series. These tests accept the hypothesis of unit root only for
two out of four series, percapita GDP and percapita CO2 emissions. Since
the level of concentration of particulate matters (PM10) is stationary, it
cannot be cointegrated with any other variable, while in principle CO2 and
GDP could be. For what concerns the dependent variable PM10, then, a
standard Least Squares Dummy Variables (LSDV) model for testing the
eect of democracy on its level it is appropriate, as it should produce sta-
tionary (possibly normal) residuals. For what concerns the model for CO2
emissions, we cannot say a priori whether the same LSDV model is appro-
priate, and a test for cointegration is mandatory. If indeed the two series
were cointegrated, that model would produce superconsistent estimates of
the parameters, but if they were not, the model would suer of the prob-
lem of the spurious regression with invalid inference of the parameters of
interest. In this case, the tendency of both series to be growing leads to cor-
relation which is picked up by the regression model, even though each series
is growing for very dierent reasons and at a rates which are uncorrelated.
Thus, in absence of cointegration (which will be tested in the next subsec-
tion) correlation between non-stationary series does not imply the kind of
causal relationship that might be inferred from stationary series, so standard
estimation techniques like OLS cannot be used.
4.1.2 Panel cointegration test
If two or more variables are nonstationary or I(1), if they are not coin-
tegrated, the residual series obtained by regressing one I(1) variable over
another I(1) variable is expected to be nonstationary, or I(1). This would
lead to spurious regression since the estimated coecients do not reect a
real relationship between those two variables, but simply correlated time
trends. This however would be dierent if those two variables were coin-
tegrated, and the coecients would benet from the \superconsistency"
property. Since in my dataset there are only two nonstationary variables,
namely, CO2 and GDP, it follows that at most one cointegrating relation
may exist. In the Engle-Granger approach, cointegration is tested by veri-
fying that the residual series generated by the regression of one I(1) variable
over another I(1) variable is stationary. To verify whether percapita CO2
emissions and percapita GDP are cointegrated, I use the approach suggested
by Kao [27]. Kao uses a two-step procedure to test for cointegration: in the
rst step, he regress the dependent variable (which is I(1)) over the indepen-
dent (also I(1)) specifying cross-section specic intercepts and homogeneous
10coecient: he basically regresses
CO2it = X0
iti + GDPit + eit (8)
where Xit is a matrix of dummy variables representing each single country
and assuming CO2it = CO2it 1 + uit and GDPit = GDPit 1 + it for t =
1;:::;T and i = 1;:::;N. Then Kao runs the pooled auxiliary regression
eit = eit 1 +
p X
j=1
 jeit j + vit (9)
Assuming p = 16, this augmented Dikey Fuller test for panel data reject
at 1% level the hypothesis that  = 1. The global ADF t-statistic for Kao
residual cointegration test with the null hypothesis of no cointegration shows
a t-stat of 3.499820 with a p-value of 0.0002, so this test strongly suggests
that those two series are cointegrated (detailed results of this test are in
appendix table D).
Maddala and Wu [32] combined test from individual cross-sections7 is
specied as follows: consider the following VAR representation for each
cross-section unit:
Yt = A1Yt 1 + A2Yt 2 + t (10)
where Y is a vector of I(1) variables (in my case, CO2 and GDP). Sub-
tracting Yt 1 on the left and right hand side of equation 10 and adding and
subtracting A2Yt 1 from the right hand side, we get
Yt = Yt 1 +  Yt 1 + t (11)
with  = (A1 + A2   I) and   =  A2. Granger's representation theorem
asserts that if the coecient matrix  has a reduced rank r < k, then
there exists kxr matrices  and  each with rank r such that  =  
0 and 0Yt is I(0). r is the number of cointegrating relations and each
column of  is the cointegrating vector, and the elements of  are known
as the adjustment parameters in the VEC model. Johansen's method is to
estimate the  matrix from an unrestricted VAR and to test whether we
can reject the restrictions implied by the reduced rank of . In performing
this test, I assume that the level data Yt have no deterministic trends and
the cointegrating equations have only interceipts, so
H(r) : Yt 1 = (0Yt 1 + 0) (12)
To determine the number of cointegrating relations r conditional on assump-
tion 12, we proceed sequentially from r = 0 to r = k   1 until we fail to
6Similar results are obtained for longer lags specications, up to four.
7Maddala and Wu use the results obtained by Fisher and Johansen [14]





log(1   i) (13)
where i is the largest eigenvalue of the  matrix.
The maximum eigenvalue statistic tests the null hypothesis of r cointe-
grating relations against the alternative of r+1 relations. The test statistics
is computed
LRmax(rjr + 1) =  T  log(1   r+1)
= LRtr(rjk)   LRtr(r + 1jk) (14)
If the test statistics are continuous, the signicance levels for each cross-
section unit, denoted by i for i = 1;2;:::;N, are independent uniform (0,1)
variables, and  2logi has a 2 distribution with two degrees of freedom.
The approach proposed by Maddala and Wu to test cointegration in panel
is to combine tests from individual cross sections to obtain a test statistic
for the full panel, using the additive property of the 2 variables: if  is the
p-value from an individual cointegration test for the cross-section i, under






Both trace and maximum eigenvalue tests reject the hypothesis of ab-
sence of cointegration at 1% level, and accept the hypothesis that there
exists one cointegrating relation8. So, substantial evidence points out that
a cointegrating relation between emissions and income exists, so the use of
a procedure that takes into account this fact is justied.
4.1.3 Weak exogeneity test
In the model for the estimation of the of the eect of the regime on the level
of CO2 emissions, I have only two non-stationary series, while the other vari-
ables are either deterministic or I(0). It follows that only one cointegrating
relation can exist, so in principle it is possible to estimate this relation-
ship using a single equation. However, estimating with a single equation
is not free of drawbacks, as it is potentially inecient, and so it does not
lead to the smallest variance against alternative approaches. In general,
information is lost unless the right-hand side variables in the cointegration
vector are weakly exogenous. Weak exogeneity of these variables is indeed
a prerequisite to assert that no useful information is lost when we condition
8In performing this test, it's been assumed that there is no deterministic trend
12on these variables without specifying their generating process. In practi-
cal terms, it must be the case that GDP is weakly exogenous with respect
to the level of CO2 emissions. As pointed out by Urbain [48], testing for
weak exogeneity requires testing whether the error-correction term embed-
ded in the short-run ECM (^ it 1 computed as a residual of the long run
relationship equation) is signicant in the equation determining GDPit.
In particular, weak exogeneity requires that GDPit does not depend on
the disequilibrium changes represented by ^ it 1.
Consider the following long run relationship for the dependent variable
percapita CO2 emissions:
CO2it = 0i + 1GDPit + 2Dit + 3Ait + 4INEQit +
+ 6Dit  INEQit + 7Ait  INEQit + it (16)
where the betas are combinations of parameters deriving from the ARDL
model (for more details, please refer to the appendix). Testing for weak
exogeneity requires, in order:
1. Estimating the coecients of equation 16
2. Computing the estimated residual series as
^ it = CO2it   ^ 0i   ^ 1GDPit   ^ 2Dit   ^ 3Ait   ^ 4INEQit +
  ^ 6Dit  INEQit   ^ 7Ait  INEQit
3. Estimating the following equation9:
GDPit = 1CO2it + 2D
it + 3A
it + 4INEQit
+ 5WDit + 6WAit   (1   )^ it 1 + ^ it 1 (17)
where the short-run interaction eects between the two trends and
inequality are
WDit = Dit  INEQit + D
it  INEQit   D
it  INEQit
WAit = Ait  INEQit + A
it  INEQit   A
it  INEQit
and ^ it is the error correction term for the equation dening the re-
lationship between GDP and CO2, and it is estimated from the long
run relationship between GDP and CO2, given by
GDPit = 0i + 1CO2 + 2Dit + 3Ait + 4INEQit +
+ 6Dit  INEQit + 7Ait  INEQit + it (18)
and ^ it 1 is already dened at point 2.
9D
 and A
 are equal, respectively, to D  Dem and A  (1   Dem)
134. Checking and testing the signicancy of the coecient attached to
^ it 1, , in the equation dened at point 3. If  is signicant in equation
17, then we cannot say that GDP is weakly exogenous and then a
multivariate model for estimation is necessary. If instead  is found to
be non-signicant, a standard error correction model with one single
equation is enough to estimate eciently the relations of interest, so
no loss of information occurs.
Results from the estimation of equation 17 for CO2 show that t-test for
 accepts the null of  = 0 at the standard level of 5%. This coecient
amounts to -0.0382668, with a standard error of 0.1013909, a t-statistic of
-0.38 and a p-value of 0.706, so GDP is shown to be weakly exogenous.
It is possible to conclude, then, that the estimation of the model for CO2
emissions using a single equation approach is appropriate, and there is no
loss of information (and eciency).
4.2 Interrupted Time Series
Interrupted time series (ITS) are a powerful quasi-experimental approach
for evaluating the eects of interventions. Segmented regression analysis of
ITS data allows to assess, in statistical terms, how much an intervention
changed an outcome of interest, immediately and over time, instantly or
with delay, and whether factors other than the intervention could explain
the change. In this paper, I make use of this ITS design to estimate the
eects of democratisation on the level of emissions produced, in a panel of
47 countries for the period 1950-2002 for CO2 and 1990-2002 for PM10.
For each country in my sample, the levels of emissions and concentration
of particulate matters, real percapita incomes and the regime are measured
at regularly spaced intervals over time. To determine the eect of a regime
change on the level of the two indexes of pollution, I generate two series
(namely, D and A representing the number of consecutive years since the
last regime change to, respectively, democracy and dictatorship) which are
divided into two or more segments at changing points, when the regime
type varies. So, if a country, at a given date, has shifted from dictatorship to
democracy, and there is only one shift in the period taken into consideration,
then the time series is divided into two segments. If the number of shifts
is n, the number of segment will be, in general, n + 1. In detail, D and A
are trend variables which are evaluated progressively according to the age
of the democracy or autocracy. The advantage of using those two variables
is that they allow assessment of the eect of the regime through time as
well whether other eects may explain the change. If indeed the coecients
relative to those trends have the same sign, this methods allows to conclude
that other factors (like general technological progress) may have played a
major role in the determination of the environmental policy, and not the
regime.
144.3 Econometric specications and results
Due to the nature of data generating process of my variables of interest, I
have to specify two dierent models for estimating the eect of the regime
on CO2 and on the level of PM10 concentrations. Previous tests for cointe-
gration between CO2 and GDP suggest that those two variables have a long
run relationship; they move closely together over time and their dierence is
stable. Test for weak exogeneity shows that GDP is weakly exogenous with
respect to CO2 so cointegration approaches which use a single equation are
appropriate and no loss of information (and eciency) occur. For estimat-
ing the eect of the regime on the level of CO2 emission, then, I will use the
procedure proposed by Engle and Granger [12]. The Engle-Granger Error
Correction Model (ECM) is appropriate in this setting and has the advan-
tage of incorporating both long run and short run eects; if the model is in
disequilibrium the ECM will provide information on the speed of adjustment
to equilibrium. Moreover, all the terms in the model are stationary, and so
standard regression techniques are valid, and nally, the fact that CO2 and
GDP are cointegrated of order CI(1,1) implies that an ECM exists (and,
conversely, an ECM generates cointegrated series) and so ECM is immune
from the spurious regression problem10.
For what concerns the estimation of the eects of the two dierent
regimes on the level of PM10 concentrations, I use a LSDV model to take
into account of country specic xed eects, and since tests for unit root
for the PM10 series show that it is stationary, standard OLS procedures
can be applied. In both econometric specications I introduce two dier-
ent trends, or, more precisely, two interrupted series of trends, D and A,
which represent, respectively, the number of consecutive years since the last
democratisation or autocratisation. During periods of dictatorship, D is
coded zero, and during periods of democracy, A is coded zero. In this setup,
D and A represent the eect through time on emissions or on concentration
of pollution of the type of regime. The other independent variables included
in the model are inequality and the cross eects of inequality with the two
trends for regime. The reason for their inclusion is that depending on who is
the decisive political actor in the two dierent regimes, inequality may have
dierent eects. So, on one hand, when the population as a whole is involved
in the decision process (through the electoral mechanism), dierent levels
of income inequality change the median voter's wealth and so the perceived
value of income (or consumption) relative to the environmental quality, and
therefore inequality is expected to worsen the environmental quality. On
the other hand, during autocratic periods, if increased inequality is in fa-
vor of the dictator11, it could increase environmental quality, since the rich
10This can be referred to Granger's representation theorem for dynamic modelling, in
Engle and Granger [12]
11It is indeed well known that many countries in Africa and the Caribbean suer and
15dictator values the environment more, compared to consumption.
In order to estimate the relation between dierent regimes and CO2
emissions, consider the following ARDL(1,1)
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X4itXzit + X4itXzit   X4itXzit

(21)
where the expression in square brackets represents the long run relationship
between CO2 and GDP. If the model is in equilibrium, this expression is
equal to zero, and if it is not, the coecient  (1   1) represents the speed
have suered from \kleptocratic" regimes (Acemoglu, Robinson and Verdier, [1]) run
by individulas who use their power to transfer a large fraction of society's resources to
themselves. Two of the most \kleptocratic successes" are those of Mubutu Sese Seko in
the Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire) and Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic.
To have an idea of the numbers, in the 70's, 15-20% of Congo's operating budget went
directly to Mubutu, and in 1977 Mubutu's family took $71 million from the National
Bank for personal use and in the 80's his personal fortune was estimated in $5 billion
(Leslie, [28], p. 72). In the Dominican Republic, Trujillo became in power after he elected
himself in a fraudulent election and at the end of his regime, the fortune of Trujillo's
family amounted to about 100% of GDP at current prices and the family \controlled
almost 80% of the country's industrial production" (Moya Pons, [40], p. 398). Other
examples of \keptocratic regimes" include Haiti under the Duvaliers, Nicaragua under
the Somozas, Uganda under Idi Amin, Liberia under Charles Taylor and the Philippines
under Ferdinand Marcos, but the list can go on, if we include less extreme cases.
16of adjustment toward it. Therefore, I rst estimate the long run relationship
between CO2 and the other covariates as follows:
CO2it = 0i + 1GDPit + 2Dit + 3Ait + 4INEQit +










using a standar LSDV to account for specic, country-level time invari-
ant eects (whose coecient is represented by 0i) and using cluster-robust
standard errors. The results of this estimation are shown in table 2. The
second step is to estimate the residuals from equation 22 and proceed to the
estimation of the unrestricted error correction model
CO2it = 01GDPit + 02D
it + 03A
it + 04INEQ +
+ 22WDit + 23WAit   (1   1)^ it 1 + it (23)
where WDit and WAit are dened as:
WDit = Dit  INEQit + D
it  INEQit   D
it  INEQit
WAit = Ait  INEQit + A
it  INEQit   A
it  INEQit
and ^ it 1 is
^ it 1 = CO2it 1   0i   1GDPit 1   2Dit 1   3Ait 1 +
  4INEQit 1   5Dit 1  INEQit 1   6Ait 1  INEQit 1
Results of the estimation of equation 23 are shown in table 3. Table F in
the appendix shows the coecients relative to the xed eects estimated in
equation 22.
As previously written, the series PM10 is stationary and therefore there
cannot exist any cointegrating relation. It follows that a simple LSDV model
is appropriate to estimate the eects of the regime, since the residuals are
expected to be stationary (results of the tests of unit root on the residuals
are shown in the appendix). In order to conform to the EKC literature,
I estimate the following equation including among the regressors also the
square and cubic powers of GDP12:
PM10it = 0i + 1GDPit + 2GDP2
it + 3GDP3
it + 4Dit + 5Ait +
+ 6INEQit + 7Dit  INEQit + 8Ait  INEQit + it (24)
12It is important to notice that the sign and the signicancy of the other covariates
remains unchanged if those two terms are excluded from the model.
17and the results are shown in table 2.
As it is possible to see, the trends for democracy and dictatorship have,
respectively, a negative eect on the level of emissions/pollution, in both
models and all the coecients (except that relative to inequality for the
model of CO2 emissions) are statistically signicant at the standard 5%
level. For model 1 (PM10), the elasticity of the concentration of PM10 with
respect to one year increase in democracy (@PM10=@D), computed at the
mean of inequality is equal to -2.1559, and the same elasticity computed for
one year increase in dictatorship (@PM10=@A) is 0.1227. For the second
model, relative to CO2 emissions, @CO2=@D = -1.285 and @CO2=@A=4.12.
It is possible to say therefore that in both models (even in the second all
the conclusions apply only to the long run period) democracy is good for
the environment, and moreover the argument is reinforced by the fact that
non-democracies are not. Table 3 shows the results from the estimation of
the unrestricted ECM for CO2 emissions:
The main results are reported in table 3. Variations in the level of CO2
are, of course, positively related to variations in global production, and the
coecient attached to ^  represents the speed of adjustment towards the
equilibrium. It is worth noting that the coecient related to D
it is not
signicant at the standard 5% level (in fact, it has a p-value of 0.574), while
the coecient related to the variation in the trend for dictatorship is pos-
itive and signicatively related to increases in the variation of emissions.
This eect may be the cause of the slower reactions of democracies with re-
spect to autocracies. Democracies are indeed constrained by consultations,
elections, every decisions has often to pass the evaluations of another in-
dependent organism, and this procedure takes time. On the contrary, in
dictatorship the decisions are taken by one individual only and they have
not to be scrutinised by other independent powers. The reasons for this
non-signicancy for the variations of the democratic level on the variation
of emissions is probably to to this dierence in the time a policy takes to be
implemented into the two dierent regimes.
5 Conclusion
Despite the dierent views about the eect of democracy on the environmen-
tal management, in this paper I show that democracy and environmental
quality are positively correlated. To show that, I use the powerful approach
of ITS design in cointegration analysis to show that democratic countries
and autocratic ones have two dierent targets of environmental quality, with
those for democracy higher than those for autocracies. Previous works on
democracy and environmental quality were indeed unable to assert that
democracy is really good for the environment because they did not show
that non-democracies are not. Segmented regression analysis of ITS allows
18Table 2: Results of the estimation of the model for PM10 and the long run
equilibrium relationship for CO2
PM10 Percapita CO2












D  INEQ 0.0518 0.764
(3.49) (2.37)




t statistics in parentheses
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01,
 p < 0:001
19Table 3: Unrestricted Error Correction Model for CO2 emissions
 Percapita CO2

















t statistics in parentheses
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01,
 p < 0:001
20not only to see the eect of democracy through time, but also if this eect
diers from the eect of autocracy. The weakness of the previous works in
this eld was therefore that not comparing the results with those for dictator-
ships, the positive eect of democracy on the environment might not be due
to democracy per se, but from other eects, like maturation, or technological
progress, common to both regimes. In this panel of 47 transition countries,
this approach shows that democratisation is consistently associated to a re-
duction of CO2 emissions and PM10 concentrations, but this process may
be quite slow because - at least in the ECM relative to CO2 emissions - it
is detectable only in the long run. Due to the fact that democratic institu-
tions tend to be slower than autocratic ones in taking decisions and acting,
in the short run we do not observe a negative eect of democracy on the
level of emissions, while the positive eect of dictatorship is quite consistent.
Inequality has two dierent eects depending on the incumbent regime: in
any case it counterbalances the global eect of the regime. In democracy,
increased inequality means that the decisive citizen is poorer and so less
willing to pay for environmental protection, while inequality during periods
of autocracy, under the assumption that this inequality favor the dictator at
the expense of the rest of the citizens, it may retain the negative eect of the
regime since it increases the dictator's income and so it increases his demand
for environmental quality. The overall eect, however, is that dictatorships
tend to be associated to a worse environment than democracies.
21Appendix
List of tables





Data for the period 1951-2002, it is
coded 1 when the regime can be clas-
sied as democratic, 0 otherwise. It
is equal to 1-REG , where REG is
the the index in Przeworski's database
\REG02" that is coded 1 if a country




CO2 Percapita emissions of CO2 estimates
expressed in metric tons of carbon
Marland, G., T.A. Boden, and R.
J. Andres, 2008. Global, Re-
gional, and National CO2 Emis-
sions. In \Trends: A Compendium
of Data on Global Change". Carbon
Dioxide Information Analysis Cen-
ter, Oak Ridge National Laboratory,
U.S. Department of Energy, Oak
Ridge, Tenn., http://cdiac.ornl.gov/
trends/emis/overview.html
Year Year the observation is referred to.
1951 - 2006
-
GDP Percapita GDP in in 1990 GK$. GK
refers to the method used to estimate
this data (Geary-Khamis method).






This variable indicates how many sub-
sequent years a country has been
democratic. It is coded 0 the year
of the switch to democracy, and 1, 2,
3 etc... after one, two or three peri-
ods since democratisation, if further
switches have not took place. It is
coded 0 if Democracy variable is equal
to 0





This variable indicates how many sub-
sequent years a country has been au-
tocratic. It is coded 0 the year of the
switch to dictatorship, and 1, 2, 3 etc...
after one, two or three periods since au-
tocratisation, if further switches have
not took place. It is coded 0 if Democ-
racy variable is equal to 1.
Data elaborated from Prze-
worski's datasets, http://politics.as.
nyu.edu/object/przeworskilinks.html
Inequality Theil index of household's income in-
equality (EHII dataset), annual obser-
vations
University of Texas Income
Inequality Project (UTIP)
http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/data.html
PM10 Annual average concentration level of
particulate matters expressed in micro-
grams per cubic meter




Forest Percentage of country's surface covered
by forest, annual observations




22Table B - Regime changes (Year)
Przeworski (1950-2002)
Country No. Switch to dem. Switch to dict.
Albania 1 1992 -
Bangladesh 1 1991 -
Bolivia 3 1979, 1982 1980
Brazil 2 1979 1964
Bulgaria 1 1990 -
Burundi 2 1993 1996
Central Afr. Rep. 1 1993 -
Chile 2 1990 1973




Cote d'Ivoire 1 2000 -
Czechoslovakia 1 1990 -
Ecuador 3 1979 1963, 2000
El Salvador 1 1984 -
Ghana 5 1969, 1979, 1993 1972, 1981
Greece 2 1974 1967
Guinea-Bissau 1 2000 -
Haiti 1 1994 -
Hungary 1 1990 -
Indonesia 1 1999 -
Kenya 1 1998 -
Korea Rep. 3 1960, 1988 1961
Laos 1 - 1959
Lesotho 1 1993 -
Madagascar 1 1993 -
Malawi 1 1994 -
Mali 1 1992 -
Mexico 1 2000 -
Moldova 1 1996 -
Nepal 2 1991 2002
Nicaragua 1 1984 -
Niger 3 1993, 2000 1996
Nigeria 4 1979, 1999 1966, 1983
Pakistan 5 1972, 1988 1956, 1977, 1999
Panama 3 1852, 1989 1968
Peru 7 1956, 1963, 1980, 2001 1962, 1968, 1990
Philippines 2 1986 1965
Poland 1 1989 -
Portugal 1 1976 -
Romania 1 1990 -
Senegal 1 2000 -
Sierra Leone 4 1996, 1998 1967, 1997
South Africa 1 1994 -
Spain 1 1977 -
Sri Lanka 2 1989 1977
Venezuela 1 1959 -
Zambia 1 1991 -
23Appendix Table C - Panel Unit root test summary
Exogenous variables: individual eect and individual trend
Lags included: 1
Series : CO2
Method Stat. Prob** Cross Section Obs
Null: Common unit root process
Levin, Lin & Chu 1.58923 0.9440 46 2164
Null: Individual unit root process
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-Stat 3.77347 0.9999 46 2164
ADF-Fisher Chi-Square 55.8579 0.9989 46 2164
PP-Fisher Chi-Square 106.053 0.1501 46 2210
Series : PM10
Method Stat. Prob** Cross Section Obs
Null: Common unit root process
Levin, Lin & Chu -19.4936 0.0000 47 517
Null: Individual unit root process
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-Stat -3.13628 0.0009 47 517
ADF-Fisher Chi-Square 131.894 0.0061 47 517
PP-Fisher Chi-Square 188.949 0.0000 47 564
Series : GDP
Method Stat. Prob** Cross Section Obs
Null: Common unit root process
Levin, Lin & Chu -0.20043 0.4206 47 2357
Null: Individual unit root process
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-Stat 3.46602 0.9997 47 2357
ADF-Fisher Chi-Square 66.3949 0.9862 47 2357
PP-Fisher Chi-Square 58.8221 0.9983 47 2404
Series : Inequality
Method Stat. Prob** Cross Section Obs
Null: Common unit root process
Levin, Lin & Chu -5.08281 0.0000 37 973
Null: Individual unit root process
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-Stat -3.28362 0.0005 37 973
ADF-Fisher Chi-Square 139.410 0.0000 37 973
PP-Fisher Chi-Square 231.032 0.0000 37 1026
**Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-Square distribution.
All other tests assume asymptotic normality
Appendix Table D - Kao residual cointegration test between CO2 and GDP
Included observations 2491
Null Hypothesis: No cointegration





Augmented Dickey Fuller test equation
Dependent variable ^ it
Method: Least squares
Included observations 2164
Variable Coe. Std.Err. t-stat Prob
^ it 1 -0.010256 0.005722 -1.792398 0.0732
^ it 1 0.026135 0.021942 1.191083 0.2338
24Appendix Table E - Johansen Fisher Panel cointegration test for CO2 and GDP
Included observations 2491
Trend assumption: No deterministic trend (restricted constant)
Lags interval (in rst dierence): 1 1





Prob Fisher stat* from
max eigen. test
Prob
None 185.7 0.0000 180.7 0.0000
At most 1 83.10 0.7353 83.10 0.7353
* Prob are computed using asymptotic Chi-square distribution
Appendix Table G - Panel Unit root test summary
Exogenous variables: none
Lags included: 1
Series : Residuals from the estimation of the long run relationship
of CO2 and the other covariates (ref. table 2)
Method Stat. Prob** Cross Section Obs
Null: Common unit root process
Levin, Lin & Chu -7.72560 0.0000 40 971
Null: Individual unit root process
ADF-Fisher Chi-Square 211.779 0.0000 40 971
PP-Fisher Chi-Square 303.568 0.0000 46 1030
Series : Residuals from the estimation of the relationship
of PM10 and the other covariates (ref. table 2)
Method Stat. Prob** Cross Section Obs
Null: Common unit root process
Levin, Lin & Chu -7.96817 0.0000 25 206
Null: Individual unit root process
ADF-Fisher Chi-Square 123.941 0.0000 25 206
PP-Fisher Chi-Square 157.196 0.0000 25 206
**Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-Square distribution.
All other tests assume asymptotic normality
The econometric model for the estimation of the unrestricted
ECM for CO2 emissions
Consider the following ARDL(1,1)
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25Appendix table F - Fixed eects coecients of the long
run equilibrium relationship of CO2 and of the model for PM10 concentrations
PM10 Percapita CO2 PM10 Percapita CO2
Albania 30.81
 -178.3 Madagascar 0 -170.3
(2.30) (-1.48) (.) (-1.46)
Bangadesh 209.1
 -82.42 Malawi 70.41
 -32.93
(22.13) (-0.75) (8.19) (-0.27)
Bolivia 108.9
 -144.0 Mali 0 0
(8.72) (-1.23) (.) (.)
Brazil 15.11 -437.5
 Mexico -4.078 -104.5





(2.63) (8.39) (2.59) (1.14)
Burundi 54.62
 -60.08 Nepal 58.47
 -85.51
(5.91) (-0.48) (6.79) (-0.71)
Central African Rep. 62.16
 -99.27 Nicaragua 0 -344.1

(7.21) (-0.82) (.) (-3.02)
Chile 25.58 -281.6
 Niger 0 0





(3.54) (-1.98) (10.71) (0.06)
Congo 0 -140.5 Pakistan 204.7
 -77.72
(.) (-1.09) (17.93) (-0.69)
Cote d'Ivoire 62.82
 -134.1 Panama 20.78 -305.0






(-0.82) (18.50) (3.20) (-2.21)
Ecuador 18.64 -207.6 Philippines 48.12
 -134.7
(1.13) (-1.80) (3.84) (-1.14)
El Salvador 41.90
 -273.7
 Poland 6.935 1696.4

(3.21) (-2.33) (0.36) (15.24)
Ghana 33.13
 -101.9 Portugal 19.07 -473.3

(3.19) (-0.80) (0.98) (-4.09)
Greece 41.67
 95.11 Romania 3.696 798.1

(2.11) (0.79) (0.24) (5.96)
Guinea-Bissau 0 0 Senegal 84.17
 -128.9
(.) (.) (8.09) (-1.10)
Haiti 0 -164.6 Sierra Leone 89.54
 20.29
(.) (-1.38) (9.31) (0.14)
Hungary -15.56 622.0
 South Africa -9.145 1628.8

(-0.78) (5.92) (-0.53) (12.39)
Indonesia 83.89
 -206.3 Spain 13.50 -185.4
(5.02) (-1.68) (0.67) (-1.55)
Kenya 47.71
 -63.74 Sri Lanka 70.38
 -312.3

(5.00) (-0.52) (4.78) (-2.70)
Korea Rep. 3.441 158.9 Venezuela 25.70 74.90
(0.16) (1.42) (1.40) (0.59)
Laos 0 0 Zambia 95.66
 83.29




t statistics in parentheses
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,    p < 0:001
26with some manipulations
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